Defence Strategic Review

Defence policy and strategy serve to secure peace and prosperity.

The assertion seems contradicted by reality. Defence policy and strategy put Australian citizens in conflict with the people of Iraq and Afghanistan. As a result:

• In Iraq alone, approximately 1 million people killed, 1-2 million widows, and 5 million orphans as of 2009.
• A massive increase in sex slavery.
• Destruction and loss of cultural heritage dating back millennia.
• People displaced: 38 million.
• For the tax-payers of the USA and friends, trillions of dollars.
• A loss of trust from their own people.
• The rise of ISIS.

So, how many bodybags full of evidence does it take to demonstrate with perfect, undeniable clarity that Defence policy does not serve peace and prosperity?

In addressing the Terms of Reference provided by the Government, our objective has been the provision of recommendations that seek to maintain our nation’s sovereignty, security and prosperity.

It should be noted that the Australian Defence Force has a specific remit and responsibility prescribed by legislation. It has no authority related to the prosperity of anything. Wishy-washy claims and ideas not specifically related to authorised activities of the Australian Defence Force should not be included in a government policy document intended to form the basis of Australian Defence Force policies for the foreseeable future.

Australia has a strong and deep Alliance with the United States

This may seem a petty objection , but starting random words with capital letters indicates a lack of professionalism among the authors and editors. The word “alliance” should start with a lower case letter in this usage.

an enviable international reputation as a capable country in military, peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations

Unfortunately Australia’s reputation and international goodwill has in recent years been foolishly squandered and besmirched by heavy-handed or bullying behaviour toward… well, any nation the Australian government deems a smaller fish.

According to The State of Southeast Asia 2021 Survey Report, a survey of 1,032 respondents across ten ASEAN states:

• Only 4.3% of respondents believed Australia provided the most help during the COVID19 pandemic period, compared to 44.2% of respondents who believed China provided the most help.
• When asked which country was the most influential economic power in Southeast Asia, only 0.3% of respondents chose Australia.
• When asked which country was the most politically and strategically influential in Southeast Asia, only 0.4% of respondents chose Australia.
• When asked “Who do you have the strongest confidence in to provide leadership in championing the global free trade agenda?”, only 2.1% of respondents chose Australia.
• When asked “Who do you have the strongest confidence in to provide leadership to maintain the rules-based order and uphold international law?”, only 2.3% of respondents chose Australia.
• When asked “If ASEAN were to seek out “third parties” to hedge against the uncertainties of the US-China strategic rivalry, who is your most preferred and trusted strategic partner for ASEAN?”, only 7.5% of respondents chose Australia.
• When asked “If the US is perceived as unreliable, who would you look to as your country’s preferred strategic partner?”, only 9.8% of respondents chose Australia, compared to 18.9% for China.
• In the section, “Trust and Distrust Rankings of Major Powers in the Region”, Australia is not even included as an option.

The fact is Australia is not seen as a major power by anyone, and is not trusted. Australia does not have, as the Defence Strategic Review states, an enviable reputation. I certainly wish Australia was a shining beacon of righteousness and hope, but telling ourselves that and patting ourselves on the back just won’t make it reality.

Even if you discount the results of that survey due to it being “only one source” or such, you must then also discount the claim of an “enviable reputation”, as stated in the policy document, for having zero sources.

Our Alliance partner, the United States, is no longer the unipolar leader of the Indo-Pacific.

Again, “alliance” begins in this use with a lower case letter. There is no such thing as “THE ALLIANCE”, carved in stone tablets by God. Australia has many agreements with many nations, but none titled “The Alliance”, or “the Alliance”.

Furthermore, our relations (including military alliances) with other nations are not a permanent fait accompli to which the Australian Defence Force is an eternal subject. Our relations with other nations are determined and reviewed regularly by the voting public of Australia. Not by the Australian Defence Force.

As a consequence, for the first time in 80 years, we must go back to fundamentals, to take a first-principles approach as to how we manage and seek to avoid the highest level of strategic risk we now face as a nation: the prospect of major conflict in the region that directly threatens our national interest.

A minor gripe again, but “first principles” is a term borrowed from physics and some other, less rigorous fields, which involves deconstructing a premise or principle until it can not be broken down to any more fundamental principles. The term has been thrown around incorrectly in the Australian government in recent years by bureaucrats with no comprehension of its meaning.

How is the term misused in this policy document? For a start, almost every premise is completely unsupported by evidence and logic. For example, “national interest” is never defined; it is some nebulous, ephemeral catch-all used to justify almost anything. Additionally, the only indication of any impending major conflict in the region has been the sabre-rattling by Australian media and government.

Strategically, we may have already entered a decisive period for the Indo-Pacific.

I suggest the supposedly decisive period about which this policy document revolves actually occurred decades ago, when manufacturing in Australia became prohibitively expensive, and we lost our ability to grow and compete. Successive administrations have increased taxes and pushed inflation to mimic actual economic growth in the GDP figures, but the only real impacts of such financial mismanagement have been increasing debt and decreasing production capacity.

As a result, our ability to address the reduced strategic warning time identified in the 2020 Defence Strategic Update has come into sharper relief.

This is indicative of geopolitical myopia. The decreasing production capacity, decreasing spending capacity without overwhelming debt, and consequent decreasing influence, have been coming down the road for decades. Remember when Australia stopped being competitive in car manufacturing, and our car industry only remained afloat by taking everyone more and paying subsidies to the big car builders? That was a symptom of the malaise.

As for reduced warning time, that is an inevitable result of improving technologies, and has always been the case. The trend is nothing new.

Climate change will increase the challenges for Defence and Australia, including increased humanitarian assistance and disaster relief tasks at home and abroad.

How and why will “climate change” increase challenges? Which challenges exactly? What are the mechanisms at play, and how do they cause the alleged effects which relate to Defence? The big scary slogan “climate change” is thrown out as an excuse, without ever being defined, or explained, or rationalised. Does it relate explicitly to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations? If so, how exactly? What quantifiable evidence links Defence operations to climate change?

The strategic risks we face require the implementation of a new approach to defence planning, force posture, force structure, capability development and acquisition.

And Springfield really needs that monorail. Why is it that “It’s different now” or “New challenges” always results in tax-payers’ dollars going to American businesses?